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ASBESTOS ABATEMENT: THE
ALLOCATION OF LIABILITY
I. PROFILE OF THE ASBESTOS PROBLEM
Each day in the United States an estimated fifteen million
children attend school in approximately thirty-one thousand
buildings that have asbestos-containing materials (ACM).' In
South Carolina alone, between three to four thousand state-
owned buildings contain ACM.2 All told, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has concluded that one out of five
public and commercial buildings in the United States contains
asbestos that can be crushed or damaged with simple hand
pressure.3
Ever since the Greeks in the first century noticed a "sick-
ness of the lungs" in slaves who weaved asbestos into cloth,4 the
ill-effects of asbestos on those who work in and around it have
been studied to some degree. Asbestos was "rediscovered" by
the western world during the industrial revolution in the eight-
eenth century and was used extensively as insulation for high-
temperature equipment. By the 1920s physicians in England had
diagnosed asbestosis as a cause of death in asbestos mill work-
ers.' By the mid-1930s numerous studies, medical researchers,
insurance companies, and the United States federal government
1. See Asbestos cleanup companies face license standards, The State (South Car-
olina), Dec. 18, 1987, at B2, col. 4.
2. See id. at A15. In the State of South Carolina's lawsuit against 93 asbestos
manufacturers, the State alleged that more than 3,000 state-owned buildings contained
asbestos. By August 1988 over 900 had been positively identified, and the state's attor-
neys estimated that the final figure may reach as high as 4,000. These figures do not
include buildings in the state universities, which also have filed suits in both state and
federal court. Interview with Deborah K. Neese, attorney with the South Carolina Attor-
ney General's Office - Asbestos Division (Aug. 4, 1988).
3. See EPA rejects national asbestos cleanup, The State (South Carolina), Mar.
1, 1988, at A15, col. 1; see also EPA, Asbestos in Buildings: A National Survey of Asbes-
tos-Containing Friable Materials (1984).
4. See Brodeur, Annals of Law - Asbestos Industry on Trial - A Failure to
Warn, THE NEW YORKER, June 10, 1985, at 49, 57.
5. See Cooke, Fiberosis of the Lungs Due to the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust,
BRIT. MED. J., July 26, 1924, at 147.
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identified potential health hazards of asbestos.' Nevertheless,
while the first published suggestion of an association between as-
bestos and malignant disease (cancer) was made in 1935,7 as late
as 1968 few people had any idea that inhaling asbestos fibers
could be dangerous. In that year, The New Yorker magazine re-
ported that kindergardens in several states used raw asbestos
dust in arts and crafts class and that certain surgeons advocated
sprinkling asbestos on surgical incisions to promote adhesion
and healing.8
In 1933 the Johns-Manville Corporation board of directors
authorized its president to pay $30,000 to settle cases brought
against the corporation by eleven former employees who had as-
bestosis0 Manville did not need to settle another asbestos claim,
however, until thirty-five years later.10 In 1972 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp.11 started the beginning of a flood of asbestos personal in-
jury suits. Borel upheld a jury award of $79,000 to the widow of
an insulation worker whose death was linked to prolonged expo-
sure to asbestos.
12
Today, asbestos-related suits against asbestos-product man-
ufacturers are being filed in ever-increasing numbers. By August
26, 1982, the Johns-Manville Corporation reported that it was
involved in approximately 11,000 asbestos health claims, which
included over 15,000 individual plaintiffs in numerous jurisdic-
6. See, e.g., Dressen, Dallavalle, Edwards, Miller, Sayers, Easom & Trice, A Study
of Asbestosis in the Asbestos Textile Industry, PUB. HEALTH BULL. No. 241, U.S. Gov't
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. (1938); Fulton, Dooley, Matthews & Houtz, Asbestosis
Part III: The Effects of Exposure to Dust Encountered in Asbestos Fabricating Plants
on the Health of a Group of Workers, DEPARTMENT LAB. INDUS., PA. BUREAU INDUS.
STANDARDS, (Harrisburg, Pa.), Spec. No. 42 (1935); Lanza, McConnell & Fehnel, Effects
of the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust on the Lungs of Asbestos Workers, 50 PUB. HEALTH
REP. 1, 1-12 (1935).
7. See Lynch & Smith, Pulmonary Asbestosis III: Carcinoma of Lung in Asbestos
- Silicosis, 24 AM. J. CANCER 56 (1935).
8. See Brodeur, The Magic Mineral, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 12, 1968, at 117, 161-
62.
9. See Brodeur, supra note 4, at 64.
10. See id. In 1968 Johns-Manville, along with four other named defendants, set-
tled a case brought by Claude Tomplait, an asbestos insulator suffering from asbestosis.
Of the named defendants, only Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. refused to settle and
eventually lost at trial. See id. at 74.
11. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
12. See id. at 1081.
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tions throughout the United States."3 In 1988 the United States
General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that over 20,000 as-
bestos-related suits were pending in federal courts at the end of
fiscal year 1987, more than triple the figure from the end of fis-
cal year 1983.1' Additionally, 'the GAO has estimated that by
1990 the federal courts' administrative office will spend
$20,900,000 to process asbestos cases. While the number of cases
do not appear overwhelming, asbestos cases frequently involve
multiple claims filed together for efficiency. Moreover, asbestos
cases require a disproportionate amount of judicial resources
compared to other civil cases.
15
II. THE SECOND WAVE OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION
A. Recognition of the Problem
Ever since the 1930s United States corporations involved in
mining and manufacturing asbestos have known that breathing
the substance may cause a potentially fatal pneumoconiosis.'8
The asbestos industry initiated several studies of asbestos mines
and factories. 17 Despite negative findings in these studies and
others, the industry failed to acknowledge the severity of danger.
Additionally, some evidence shows that similar studies con-
ducted by other groups, including contractors, were either with-
held from publication or published in a misleading form.',
The failure of the industry and the public to recognize the
dangerous side effects of asbestos aided its dramatic increase in
use in the United States. Between 1932 and 1974 asbestos con-
sumption rose from approximately 100,000 to nearly 800,000
metric tons.' 9 Asbestos was used widely in the production of in-
sulation, textile, brakes, tobacco products, dish towels, table salt,
13. See Affidavit of James F. Beasly, In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 420
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1983).
14. See Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) T 680 (July 15, 1988). The pending cases
increased from 5,885 at the end of 1983 to 20,278 at the end of 1987.
15. See D. HENSLER, W. FELSTINER, M. SELVIN, & P. EBENER, ASBESTOS IN THE
COURTS, THE CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic TORTS 24 (1985) [hereinafter D. HENSLER].
16. See sources cited supra note 6.
17. See Lanza, McConnell & Fehnel, supra note 6.
18. See B. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 608 (2d ed. 1986).
19. See id. at 614.
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water pipes, hair dryers, and even intravenous drugs.2 0 Virtually
every American was exposed to some form of the mineral.
Unlike yesteryear when asbestos manufacturing workers
and construction workers faced the greatest risk of ACM expo-
sure, maintenance workers today face the greatest threat of
ACM exposure because of their proximity to asbestos thermal
insulation.21 Another group at risk are the occupants of build-
ings that have deteriorating asbestos ceilings, fireproofings, and
air plenums. Building owners, increasingly more aware of their
potential liability to occupants and workers, are facing the enor-
mous expense of asbestos removal by speciality contractors.
Awareness of potential personal liability actions against owners,
administrators, and management, in addition to a concern for
the health of occupants and employees, has served to speed up
removal and abatement procedures. The roadblock to asbestos
abatement no longer is ignorance but the high cost of proper as-
bestos management.
B. Asbestos in the Schools
The asbestos-in-buildings issue has been a focus of public
attention for several years. In particular, asbestos in schools has
been an area of concern. By 1984 numerous state legislatures
and regulatory agencies were beginning to take action and pass
asbestos-related laws.2 In the years 1982 and 1984, Congress
took action by passing two statutes that dealt specifically with
the issue of asbestos in schools.23 The EPA also began to take
action due to public pressure and Congressional mandate.
In 1983 the EPA published the "Asbestos-in-Schools"
20. See EPA, Proceedings of the National Workshop on Substitutes for Asbestos,
July 14-16, 1980 (1981).
21. See, e.g., Destephano, Plant Designed Grinder Makes Usuable Material From
Scrap, S. POWER & INDUS., June 1960, at 35.
22. See ASBESTOS ABATEMENT RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, SPECIAL REPORT (BNA),
at 104-161 (1987) [hereinafter ASBESTOS ABATEMENT].
23. See Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control Act of 1980 (codified at 20
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3611 (1982)); Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act of 1984 (codified at
20 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021 (Supp. II 1984)).
24. See Response to Citizens Petition on Asbestos, Public Meeting, 49 Fed. Reg.
15,094 (1984); Asbestos, Response to Citizens Petition on Asbestos, 49 Fed. Reg. 8450
(1984).
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rule,25 which required schools to identify friable asbestos, test
the air, and notify employees and parent-teacher groups of their
findings by June 1983. Despite these requirements, the EPA
failed to supply any precise data or advice concerning the repair
or removal of ACM. Further, the EPA declined to say what am-
bient concentrations of asbestos posed a danger to teachers and
students. As a result, many school administrators failed to per-
ceive a danger in their schools and by the end of 1986, only sixty
percent had complied with the asbestos-in-schools regulation.26
Many other school districts sought to abate the asbestos in
their buildings by hiring inexperienced and untrained asbestos-
removal firms. Unqualified firms often were unable to cure the
asbestos problem and, in some cases, actually may have in-
creased the danger to the occupants.27 In an attempt "to right
this highly confused and potentially dangerous state of af-
fairs,"28 Congress passed the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Re-
sponse Act of 1986 (AHERA).29 The Act ordered the EPA to
issue regulations within 360 days governing school inspections
and response actions. By the time AHERA was passed, more
than 300 school districts already had filed suit in both federal
and state courts against the manufacturers and suppliers of
ACM. 30
The school districts' continued noncompliance with asbestos
inspection, reporting, and abatement regulations is a serious
matter that may expose both school districts and officials to lia-
bility.31 Moreover, school administrators who discover asbestos
in their buildings and fail to take action or notify employees and
parents may face tort liability. Because a knowing failure to
warn arguably is "intentional," some administrators may not be
25. See C. HARVEY & M. ROLLINSON, A Guide For School Administrators, Teachers,
and Parents, in ASBESTOS IN THE SCHOOLS 5 (1987).
26. See id.
27. See Fried, Asbestos Abatement: A Pragmatic Survey of Problems and Solu-
tions, in ASBESTOS: REGULATION, REMOVAL AND PROHIBITION, LITIGATION SOURCE HAND-
BOOK SERIES No. 322, at 118-20 (1987).
28. Safe Bldgs. Alliance v. EPA, 846 F.2d 79, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 366 (1988).
29. Pub. L. No. 99-519, 100 Stat. 2970 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-2654 (Supp.
IV 1986)).
30. See In re School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 915 (1986).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1966).
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able to assert a sovereign immunity defense.3 2
The general awareness of the asbestos danger should en-
courage school officials to take action when asbestos is found.
Administrators, however, should be aware that even licensed,
bonded, and insured asbestos contractors may do a "dirty job"
and further contaminate schools. Properly conducted and super-
vised asbestos abatement is the only method by which school
districts and administrators may avoid legal liability.
C. Commercial Buildings
1. Problems Associated with the Lease and Sale of Asbestos-
Contaminated Buildings
Responsibility for identifying the presence of asbestos, de-
termining whether the ACMs are hazardous, and initiating
abatement procedures, rests with building owners."3 Building
users may sue building owners to force them to remove asbes-
tos.34 Due to the current state of the law and the costs involved
with asbestos abatement, a tremendous amount of litigation po-
tentially may arise between building owners and building
users.
3 5
Another potential for litigation lies in the responsibilities of
previous owners to current owners and current owners to poten-
tial buyers. Included in these classes are the real estate brokers
32. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), a plaintiff may sue a public official who, under
color of state law, causes "deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws [of the United States]." Id. Governmental immunity has been
rejected by a number of courts in recent years. See, e.g., Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach
City School Dist., 22 Cal. 3d 508, 585 P.2d 851, 150 Cal.Rptr. 1 (1978).
33. See Fried, supra note 27, at 120 (citing U.S. Attorney General's Asbestos Lia-
bility Report).
34. Yet under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), tenants who are
employers also have a responsibility for asbestos control. See Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651, 654 (1982). Additionally, if the tenant-employer
initiates any change in condition of the asbestos, he may be responsible for its control.
See W. PROSSER, THE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 102 at 668-69, (4th ed. 1971).
But see Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E. 2d 173 (1969) (intervening negligence
of a third person will not relieve original wrongdoer of responsibility if intervention
should have been foreseen).
35. See Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987) (City of
Greenville was ordered to remove asbestos and, in turn, sued the supplier for the cost of
removal).
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and lending institutions involved in the sales who themselves
may owe certain duties and obligations. Numerous possible
claims also could be brought against the seller of an asbestos-
contaminated building. In South Carolina, for instance, a plain-
tiff might allege a claim under strict liability., South Carolina
courts have held that a manufacturer or assembler has a duty to
test and inspect the components incorporated into its product.3
7
The definition of "product" has been expanded to include the
sale of a house." Additionally, some courts, both in and outside
of South Carolina, have applied the doctrine of strict liability to
sales-service hybrid transactions. Arguably, a contractor's instal-
lation of a product is such a transaction." By categorizing a
house - and logically a commercial building - as a product,
many of those involved in the sale of a "defective" building
might be liable to the buyer under the doctrine of strict liabil-
ity.4° The contractor and subcontractor who installed the asbes-
tos also are potentially liable under a sales-service hybrid trans-
action theory.
Commercial building owners who fail to disclose the pres-
ence of asbestos contamination in the sale or lease of their build-
ings also may be liable under a theory of "passive" conceal-
ment.41 The theory of passive concealment most typically has
been applied to the sale of residential property since these buy-
ers are considered less sophisticated.42
36. For a discussion of the South Carolina strict liability statute, S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976), see Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and
Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803 (1976).
37. See Baughman v. General Motors Corp., 780 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing
Nelson v. Coleman Co., 249 S.C. 652, 155 S.E.2d 917 (1967)); see also Torts, Annual
Survey of South Carolina Law, 34 S.C.L. REV. 243 (1982).
38. See Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 501, 229 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1976).
39. See, e.g., O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826 (Minn.
1977) (subcontractor supplied and installed floor furnace that injured plaintiff); Worrell
v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971) (contractor liable for installation of defective
gas fitting in course of remodeling home); DeLoach v. Whitney, 275 S.C. 543, 273 S.E.2d
768 (1981).
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966) (adopted in South Caro-
lina under S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976)).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965).
42. South Carolina implicitly has recognized that one-time sellers of goods have a
duty to warn buyers about known dangers of which they know or have reason to know.
See Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. at 503-504, 229 S.E.2d at 731. The same basic
principles of failure to warn were applied in personal injury suits against asbestos manu-
facturers. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp, 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
10491989]
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Some passive concealment jurisdictions might require com-
mercial building owners to disclose the presence of asbestos to
potential purchasers and tenants. 43 A claim against the seller
might be improved because of the current magnitude of public-
ity and regulations concerning asbestos.44 Furthermore, even if a
building owner is successful in using an ignorance defense, the
buyer of an asbestos-contaminated building might void the sale
under a theory of mutual mistake. A mutual mistake argument
might be successful even if the contract contains an "as is"
clause.",
In addition to the sellers' and lessors' liability, real estate
brokers who participate in the sale of an ACM-contaminated
building may incur liability. Arguably, brokers have a duty to
determine whether the property they are selling is contaminated
with asbestos. Liability may exist under either a negligence' or
an implied warranty of habitability theory.
47
Although no sound theory of liability is applicable against
lending institutions, they nevertheless impact the asbestos
abatement problem. Due to the ever-increasing costs and re-
sponsibilities associated with abatement and disposal of ACM,
most lending institutions refuse to lend on a building containing
asbestos, and some will not lend on buildings that ever con-
tained it."8
The shrewd building owner may attempt to avoid a disclo-
sure duty by use of a "hazardous substances on the premises"
disclaimer clause. Nevertheless, due to the steadily increasing
number of lending institutions and real estate firms that require
environmental assessments prior to the sale of commercial prop-
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
43. See Wolfe, Asbestos Warning: Commercial Building Owners Beware, 67 MICH.
BAR J., No. 3, at 244 (1988) (analysis of passive concealment theory under Michigan law).
44. Building owners, however, probably could not make a credible claim of igno-
rance of the asbestos problems in their buildings. See supra text accompanying notes 21-
23.
45. See Wolfe, supra note 43, at 246-47.
46. See Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984) (bro-
ker owes duty under a negligence theory to inspect premises).
47. Cf. Holder v. Haskett, 283 S.C. 247, 321 S.E.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1984) (real estate
agent may be liable under implied warranty of habitability theory if party to contract).
Attorneys should consider including a disclaimer clause in purchase agreements, rather
than an "as is" clause.
48. See Looking for Trouble, The State (South Carolina), Sept. 12, 1988 (Business
South Carolina Magazine), at 9.
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erty,49 disclaimer clauses may not escape the scrutiny of buyers
or their agents. Instead of a disclaimer clause, buyers might at-
tempt to insert a clause under which the seller guarantees a
building free of asbestos or other hazardous substances. Asbes-
tos evaluations may become a routine part of the due-diligence
determination made prior to a commercial building
transaction."
2. Allocation of Liability: Planning for Cost-Recovery
Actions
In 1982 when Johns-Manville filed for reorganization under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,51 it signaled the beginning
of a new era in asbestos litigation. The Manville suit attracted
wide publicity and heightened public knowledge and concern
over both the danger of exposure to asbestos and the complexi-
ties of the legal aspects of recovery. New theories of liability
based on potential injury due to exposure created the second
wave of asbestos law suits - the property damage claim. Plain-
tiffs in property damage claims typically sought recovery for the
cost of inspecting and abating asbestos contamination in their
buildings.2 School districts, 53 cities,54 and states55 led the way
by attempting to compel the asbestos manufacturers to pay the
abatement costs.
Since the primary responsibility for asbestos identification
49. See id. at 8.
50. See Wolfe, supra note 43, at 247.
51. On August 26, 1982, Johns-Manville and its parent, Manville Corporation, filed
voluntary petitions in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
New York for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Case Nos. 82B
11656-11676 (B.L.).
52. See NSBA COUNCIL OF SCHOOL ATTORNEYS, UNCOVERING THE ASBEsTos HAZARD,
at Tab 10 (1983) (example of standard complaint used by school districts in asbestos
property damage claim against asbestos manufacturer).
53. See, e.g., Spartanburg County School Dist. Seven v. National Gypsum Co., No.
83-1744-14 (D.S.C. filed July 26, 1983); Lexington County School Dist. Five v. United
States Gypsum, No. 82-2072-0 (D.S.C. filed Aug. 17, 1982); Spartanburg County School
Dist. Six v. National Gypsum Co., No. 83-CP-42-1756 (S.C. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 1984).
54. See, e.g., Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987).
55. Suits have been filed by the states of Maryland, Illinois, West Virginia and
South Carolina against asbestos manufacturers, and these currently are awaiting trial.
See Interview with Deborah K. Neese, supra note 2.
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and abatement rests with building owners,56 they must develop
and implement a plan of action. As an important part of any
such plan, owners should seek competent legal counsel to learn
what steps must be taken to ensure that any potential cost re-
covery rights are not forfeited. Additionally, they must act to
minimize their own potential liability and develop a defensive
strategy for any potential legal actions. The most important
strategy for owners is to keep complete documentation of ex-
isting conditions of hazardous assessment actions and of correc-
tive actions they have taken.
5 7
In assessing the best method for appropriate record keeping,
the threshold question may be whether any records should be
kept at all. Some owners, upon discovering asbestos in their
buildings, may fail to make prompt disclosure or keep adequate
documentation under the fear that records could be legally in-
criminating. Management of an asbestos-abatement program,
however, is different from most project management activities.
History has shown that the inspection, isolation, enclosure, and
removal of ACM may take several years to accomplish." In ad-
dition, failure to keep records adequately may weaken a liability
defense. Without good records, the defendant may be unable to
refresh memories and provide supporting evidence.59
III. POTENTIAL LIABILITY OF "PERSONS" OTHER THAN THE
MANUFACTURERS
To date, almost all of the suits by asbestos victims, both for
personal injury and property damage, have been brought against
the ACM manufacturers. Today, ACM manufacturers might not
provide the deep pocket they did formerly. 0 Actions against
56. See Fried, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
57. See Fox, The Owners Responsibility, 27 ASBESTOS ABATEMENT, 30 (1986).
58. See id.
59. See G. PETERS & B. PETERS, 3 SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL,
LEGAL AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS 61 (1988).
60. First, some manufacturers' assets are tied up in bankruptcy. See supra note 51;
see also The State (South Carolina), Apr. 12, 1988, at D6 (Manville has constructed a
separate warehouse to store the millions of documents pertaining to asbestos-related
claims against them). Second, there is a backlog of federal asbestos cases. See D. HEN-
SLER, supra note 15. Third, repetitious punitive damages awards are drying up manufac-
turers' assets. See, e.g., Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 827 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987)
(upholding an award of two million dollars in punitive damages); In re School Asbestos
[Vol. 401052
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parties other than manufacturers are worth exploring.
For used buildings, a cause of action may exist against both
the prior owner and the real estate broker from whom the build-
ing was purchased.6 1 Tort liability may exist if the prior owners
or real estate agent was passively or secondarily negligent in
causing injury to some third person due to their failure to dis-
cover and warn of the danger. The secondarily negligent parties,
as well as the manufacturers, may be liable to third persons.2
The visibility and financial status of prior owners and real estate
brokers may make them attractive defendants.
A. Distributors/Material Suppliers
While as a general rule distributors are not liable for latent
defects in products sold in sealed packages or containers, they
are required to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury from
known dangers. In such circumstances, distributors must trans-
mit proper warnings and instructions.6 3 Liability for products
Litigation, 789 F.2d 996, 1001 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986); see also Sur-
rick, Punitive Damages and Asbestos Litigation in Pennsylvania; Punishment or Anni-
hilation, 87 DICK. L. REV. 265 (1983).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 36-50. A creative cross-claim for the owner,
who himself is made a defendant, may lie in the law of indemnity. Indemnity could
remove any statute of limitations or repose problems that exist in some jurisdictions. See
C. HARVEY & M. ROLLISON, supra note 25, at 55-56.
62. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 93, 95 (1936); see also St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. v. United States, 187 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1951); Kelly v. Diesel Constr. Div.
of Carl A. Morse, Inc., 35 N.Y.2d 1, 315 N.E.2d 751, 358 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1974). Even so,
because these two parties are not in pari delicto, the one who was passively negligent
may maintain an action for indemnity against the actively negligent party.
The usefulness of an indemnity claim rests partially on whether or not the jurisdic-
tion in which it is raised has adopted comparative fault. In such a forum a passively
negligent supplier or installer is not entitled to 100% indemnity from a negligent manu-
facturer. See Tolbert v. Gerber Indus., 255 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 1977). Therefore, any
time building owners, contractors, or suppliers are sued because asbestos is present, they
may escape liability by asserting that the manufacturers must indemnify them. See
Weber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 630 F. Supp. 285 (D.N.J. 1986); Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
1 183 (Dec. 1987). The probable success of such an indemnification claim is limited by
the reality that owners and contractors commonly will not be named as defendants if the
manufacturers are both identifiable and liquid. Owners and contractors may have been
as unaware as the plaintiffs as to the dangers of asbestos. But see B. CASTLEMAN, supra
note 18; Technology: Spray Fireproofing Faces Controls or Ban as Research Links As-
bestos to Cancer, 133 ARCHITECTURAL F. 50 (1970).
63. See 2A L. FRUmER & M. FRmDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABLITY § 6.12[4][C] (1988). But
see Pierce v. Liberty Furniture Co., 141 Ga. App. 175, 233 S.E.2d 33 (1977) (passage of
UCC had the effect of eliminating sealed container doctrine for breach of warranty).
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with latent defects normally will be imposed on distributors
under either a breach of warranty theory, when there is privity
of contract," or a strict liability in tort theory.
6 5
The chief difficulty of asserting claims made against vendors
of asbestos, when the vendor is not a subsidiary of the manufac-
turer, is that the plaintiff may be required to show that the dis-
tributor had actual or constructive knowledge of the defect in
the product. Distributors are required only to exercise reasona-
ble care to prevent injury from "known" dangers."6 If one ac-
cepts the "conspiracy of silence" claim commonly made against
manufacturers, this requisite knowledge would be very difficult
to prove. Although distributors should have had knowledge of
the dangerous propensities of ACM after 1964 to 1970,67 the pri-
mary responsibility to warn consumers of this danger remained
with the manufacturer.68 Only if the distributor assumed liabil-
ity by holding the asbestos products out to the public as his
own, or if the plaintiff can show asbestos to be "unreasonably
dangerous," can the distributor's knowledge of its dangerous
qualities be presumed. 9
Certain jurisdictions, however, have strictly construed the
comments to the Restatement of Torts, holding that Rule 402A
"applies to any manufacturer of such a product, to any whole-
sale or retail dealer or distributor. 7 0 Courts in these jurisdic-
tions reason that distributors may seek indemnity from the
manufacturer responsible for creating the defective condition.7 1
64. See 2A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 63, §§ 19.03 (4)(c), 20.04 (1).
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966).
66. See 2A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 63.
67. See B. CASTLEMAN, supra note 18, at 298. In 1964 Johns-Manville began using
warning labels on asbestos insulation products, and by 1970 labels were attached to other
asbestos products such as sacks of fiber, cement, and brake linings.
68. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods., Inc., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
69. R. KERRIGAN & V. STILWELL, How Do I Avoid Liability From Mistakes in Shop
Drawings and Defects in Products Described in Brochures, Manufacturer's Specifica-
tions and By Samples?, in AVOIDING LIABILITY IN ARCHITECTURE, DESIGN, AND CONSTRUC-
TION 211 (1983).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment f (1965).
71. See, e.g., Bryan v. John Bean Div. of F.M.C. Corp., 566 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir.
1978); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Corp., 665 S.W.2d 414, 432 (Tex. 1984) (mere conduit
of defective products may seek indemnification from manufacturer).
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B. Architects and Engineers
Design professionals generally are not held to a strict liabil-
ity standard for defective products. Nevertheless, liability can
attach to design professionals for mistaken or careless approval
of defective products when the defect was ascertainable by rea-
sonable investigation.7 2 Both architects and engineers are re-
quired to exercise the ordinary skill and diligence of their pro-
fession in preparing plans and specifications, and they must
guard against defects as to materials and construction.
7 3
Absent a special agreement, a design professional does not
implicitly warrant that his design will accomplish the desired re-
sult.7 4 Therefore, the liability of a design professional may turn
on the extent to which the use of asbestos was considered an
accepted practice by like professionals. 5 Although acceptance of
the completed structure by the owner may be considered prima
facie evidence that the project was completed in a workmanlike
manner, it does not constitute a waiver of claims for latent de-
fects caused by deficient or defective plans and workmanship
not discoverable by simple inspection.76
C. Real Estate Brokers
As previously discussed, some authority supports the claim
that real estate brokers and agents have a duty to investigate
and disclose latent defects in properties that they sell. While a
claim against a broker normally will arise in the sale of a used
72. See R. KERRIGAN & V. STILWELL, supra note 69, at 219.
73. See Montijo v. Swift, 219 Cal. App. 2d 351, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133 (1963); Miller v.
De Witt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967).
74. See, e.g., City of Mounds View v. Walijarvi, 263 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. 1978); Mi-
lau Assocs., Inc. v. North Ave. Dev. Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 482, 368 N.E.2d 1247, 398 N.Y.S.2d
882 (1977). But see Hill v. Polar Pantries, 219 S.C. 263, 64 S.E.2d 885 (1951) (design
professional held to impliedly warrant that structure will be reasonably fit for its in-
tended use); Avent v. Proffitt, 109 S.C. 48, 95 S.E. 134 (1918) (architect liable for failure
to discover and condemn defective plastering in house erected under his supervision).
75. In December 1970 a prominent architectural publication carried an article that
discussed the health hazards of asbestos and the problems that the construction industry
was experiencing in complying with regulations concerning the use of asbestos. See
Spray Fireproofing Faces Control or Ban as Research Links Asbestos to Cancer, 133
ARCHITECTURAL F. 50 (1970).
76. See UNCOVERING THE ASBEsTos HAZARD, supra note 52.
77. See supra notes 46 & 47 and accompanying text.
10551989]
13
Nelson: Asbestos Abatement: The Allocation of Liability
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REViEW
building containing asbestos, the owner of a newly purchased
structure also may allege misrepresentation.
Two landmark 1984 decisions, Easton v. Strassburger" in
California and Gouveia v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial
Center, Inc.s0 in New Mexico, may have created a strict respon-
sibility on the part of real estate representatives toward pur-
chasers. Under these cases, a broker has a duty to investigate
any "red flags" that indicate latent defects, and he cannot make
misrepresentations with respect to known or discoverable de-
fects. This is true even when there is no direct contact between
the purchaser and the broker prior to the sale.81
In the not too distant past, the caveat emptor standard pro-
tected realtors from liability for innocent misrepresentation and
latent defects. While caveat emptor is still followed in many
states, state courts increasingly have imposed liability on real es-
tate brokers for any kind of misrepresentation. 2 Section
551(c)(1) of the Restatement of Torts states that a building pur-
chaser may seek restitution for any loss caused by justifiable re-
liance on an innocent misrepresentation. 3 Thus, one who
purchases a building containing asbestos based on a realtor's as-
surance that the building is in "top shape," or some such similar
claim, may have a cause of action against the realtor. To date,
no South Carolina court has considered such a claim; however,
one may infer from South Carolina's acceptance of the doctrine
of caveat venditors4 that liability may be extended to a realtor
as the vendor of a building.
As a precaution to liability for negligent or innocent misrep-
resentations made to purchasers regarding the presence of ACM
78. Brokers have been found liable for a variety of misrepresentations concerning
both real property and new homes. See, e.g., Loch Ridge Constr. Co. v. Barra, 291 Ala.
312, 280 So. 2d 745 (1973); see also Gauerke v. Rozga, 112 Wis. 2d 271, 332 N.W.2d 804
(1983) (holding that brokers are strictly responsible for any representations).
79. 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
80. 101 N.M. 572, 686 P.2d 262 (Ct. App. 1984).
81. See Treece & Clawson, The Real Estate Broker's Duty to Investigate, FOR THE
DEFENSE, May 1988 at 11.
82. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Connall, 108 Wash. 2d 69, 77-78, 736 P.2d 242, 247 (1987)
(Bore, J., dissenting).
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(c)(1) (1977).
84. The vendor is liable for defective buildings in the sale of a home between an
innocent purchaser and a vendor who places the building in the stream of commerce. See
Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980); Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267
S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976); see also infra note 108 and accompanying text.
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in a building, real estate brokers and agents should not make
representations unless they are certain of the truth of the infor-
mation. Further, any representations made to a purchaser
should not be represented as being based on the broker's own
knowledge. Additionally, attorneys should consider advising
realtors to draft contracts that include a disclaimer clause con-
cerning the presence of any toxic substances, in addition to the
more common "as is" clause. 5
Moreover, brokers cannot escape liability through silence or
nondisclosure. If realtors intentionally withhold information
from purchasers who rely on the nondisclosures to their detri-
ment, the realtor's action constitutes intentional fraud. In Rob-
erts v. Estate of Barbagallo8 6 a broker followed a policy of non-
disclosure regarding the presence of ureaformaldehyde foam
insulation (UFFI) in his listed houses. The broker knew that
this type of insulation creates a potential health hazard, but
mentioned nothing to the purchaser about its presence in the
house. After purchasing the house, the plaintiff-buyer discovered
it contained UFFI and sued to rescind the sale contract. As a
result of the broker's fraudulent concealment of a material fact,
the Pennsylvania court granted rescission. 7
D. Contractor and Subcontractor
Generally, absent specific contract provisions, a contractor's
obligations end when the structure is completed and the owner
has accepted the work.8 In addition, when construction materi-
als contain latent defects, some courts hold that the contractor
is not liable for injury to the structure caused by the defect.8 9
Courts also have found that contractors operate under cer-
tain implied warranties. Some of the most commonly found im-
plied warranties include the following: 1) that materials supplied
85. See supra text accompanying note 45.
86. 366 Pa. Super. 559, 531 A.2d 1125 (1987).
87. See id. at 573, 531 A.2d at 1132.
88. See 13 AM. JUR. 2D Building and Construction Contracts § 27 (1964 & Supp.
1988).
89. See id. § 27. See generally Annotation, Liability of Builder or Subcontractor
for Insufficiency of Building Resulting from Latent Defects in Materials Used, 61
A.L.R.3D 792 (1975) (no contract or tort liability for latent defects that escape a reasona-
ble inspection).
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will be of good quality; 2) that the construction will be done in a
workmanlike manner and in accordance with good usage and ac-
cepted trade practices; 3) that the resulting structure will be
merchantable - a structure that passes in the trade without ob-
jection; 4) that the contractor services will be fit or suitable for
their intended purpose; and 5) that the resulting building will be
in compliance with local building codes and will be suitable for
the use for which the structure was intended 0 Most states, in-
cluding South Carolina, imply at least one of the above. 1
As late as the last century the generally accepted rule was
that builders made no implied warranties against latent defects
in the materials used in construction.2 The implied warranty
that construction materials will be of good quality and free from
latent defects has emerged only recently.93 Cases between own-
ers and contractors that install ACM in structures might be a
forum for further judicial expansion of the implied warranty of
quality for construction materials. This implied warranty theory
may be the only method of redress for an owner if the supplier
or manufacturer of ACM cannot be reached.
Implied warranties that the construction will be done in a
workmanlike manner and that the work is fit for the intended
purpose often exist in tandem. South Carolina has accepted both
theories in the sale of new homes. 4 In Terlinde v. Neely95 the
90. See 4 Constr. Law (MB) 1 18.03 (1988).
91. See Note, Implied Warranties in Home Construction: Subsequent Purchasers,
33 S.C.L. REv. 33 (1981); see also Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d
728 (1976); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970). Accord Hefler v.
Wright, 121 Ill. App. 3d 739, 460 N.E.2d 118 (1984); McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275,
398 A.2d 1283 (1979); Air Heaters, Inc. v. Johnson Elec., Inc., 258 N.W.2d 649 (N.D.
1977).
92. See, e.g., Wisconsin Red Pressed Brick Co. v. Hood, 67 Minn. 329, 334-35, 69
N.W. 1091, 1092 (1897).
93. In Clark v. Campbell, 492 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973), a Missouri court
held that it was error to instruct a jury that if a defect in materials was found to be
latent, the owner could not recover against the contractor. See Kubby v. Crescent Steel,
105 Ariz. 459, 460, 466 P.2d 753, 754 (1970); Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 1096-97,
449 S.W.2d 922, 926-27 (1970). But see Wood-Hopkins Contracting Co. v. Masonry Con-
tractors, Inc., 235 So. 2d 548, 551-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Cantrell v. Woodhill
Enters., Inc., 273 N.C. 490, 160 S.E.2d 476 (1968).
94. In Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970), the supreme
court held that "in the sale of a new house by the builder-vendor there is an implied
warranty that the house was built in a reasonably workmanlike manner and is reasonably
suitable for habitation." Id. at 414, 175 S.E.2d at 795.
95. 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980).
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South Carolina Supreme Court apparently extended the theories
to subsequent purchasers.9 6 In Arvai v. Shaw,97 however, the
court retreated, limiting implied warranties to the sale of new
homes. The court failed to hold a custom builder of a home lia-
ble when it was not involved in the sale of the home. Instead,
the court held that liability exists only for those that placed the
home "into the stream of commerce." '98
After Arvai the only parties who may be liable for the sale
of a defective home are those who both build and sell a com-
pleted structure (builder-vendors) and those who sell a com-
pleted structure built by someone else (vendors). A party who
builds a defective structure apparently is not liable for defects
under an implied warranty of fitness in South Carolina. This ap-
proach recently was echoed by the South Carolina court of ap-
peals decision Carolina Winds Owners' Association v. Joe
Harden Builder, Inc.9 In Carolina Winds the court of appeals
held that while the vendor of a new home impliedly warrants the
house as being free from latent defects that would render it un-
inhabitable,100 the general contractor who builds the home is not
liable for defects because he is not a party to the initial sale of
the building.10' In so holding, the court resurrected the doctrine
of privity of contract in new home sales by stating that the
owner of a new building has no contractual cause of action
against anyone other than those with whom he has contracted if
his only claim is for diminuation in the building's value. 02 Thus,
Arvai has been reaffirmed in limiting causes of action for owners
of new homes to builder-vendors and vendors.
In Lane v. Trenholm Building Co.10 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court extended the category of parties who may be liable
for latent defects in new homes by ruling that the law of sales,
and not property, controls. Logically, the sale of a commercial
96. See id. at 397-99, 271 S.E.2d at 769-70. Under Terlinde the only apparent limi-
tations are requirements that the defect is latent and the warranty be extended only for
a "reasonable amount of time." Id.
97. 289 S.C. 161, 345 S.E.2d 715 (1986).
98. Id. at 164, 345 S.E.2d at 717.
99. 297 S.C. 74, 374 S.E.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1988), aff'd on rehearing, No. 25 Davis
Adv. Sh. 21 (S.C. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 1988).
100. See id. at -' 374 S.E.2d at 899L
101. See id. at -' 374 S.E.2d at 900-01.
102. See id. at -' 374 S.E.2d at 902.
103. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
105919891
17
Nelson: Asbestos Abatement: The Allocation of Liability
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
building also should be governed by the law of sales. Any inno-
cent purchaser, unsophisticated in the construction business,
therefore, should be protected from latent defects.104 Although
Lane expanded liability to include those who were mere vendors,
Arvai failed to expand the category of defendants to include
builders. Rather, the court held that simply building a structure
is not enough to trigger an implied warranty.
10 5
Both Arvai and Carolina Winds present a paradox when
viewed against the policies supporting Rutledge and Lane -
protecting the consuming public. After Arvai the party who is
often the most culpable in creating structural defects, the
builder, usually is not liable under an implied warranty. The
paradox of Avrai has led to some confusion among both the
South Carolina legal community and the construction industry
regarding the development of implied warranty. The confusion
has been furthered by the court of appeals' decision in Carolina
Winds, which in practicality has abolished the rule of caveat
venditor in South Carolina. Hopefully, the South Carolina Su-
preme Court will clarify the law of implied warranty in the near
future. Until such time, however, South Carolina building own-
ers apparently have no redress against contractors who, acting
without negligence, install ACM (unless the installer is also the
vendor).
Although most states still hold that under a typical con-
struction contract a contractor's warranties run only to those in
privity of contract with him,' some courts have dispensed with
the privity requirement in the same manner that South Carolina
appears to have done in Terlinde.10 7 Subsequent purchasers
need an implied warranty for the same reasons as the original
owner. While contractors should not be held to a standard of
perfection, a purchaser - whether an individual homeowner or
a business - who has relied on a contractor's construction
knowledge should not be barred from holding that contractor li-
104. See id. at 503, 229 S.E.2d at 731.
105. See Arvai, 289 S.C. at 164, 345 S.E.2d at 717.
106. See, e.g., Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 572, 378 A.2d 599, 601
(1977); Stewart v. Gainesville Glass Co., 131 Ga. App. 747, 751, 206 S.E.2d 857, 859
(1974), afl'd, 233 Ga. 578, 212 S.E.2d 377 (1975); John H. Armbruster & Co. v. Hayden
Co.-Builder Developer, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
107. See generally Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. at 399, 271 S.E.2d at 770 (citing other
jurisdictions that had disposed of privity requirement prior to Terlinde).
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able for latent defects in the building he purchased from him.
Owners also might base claims against contractors on a
products liability theory. Even in states that have refused to
view the entire building as a product, a product liability could
arise for the use of asbestos in part of a building. For example,
some courts hold contractors and subcontractors liable for in-
stallation of "individual items" in the building. 0 8 Although
products liability claims by owners against contractors are rare,
such a claim would preclude the use of standard contract and
warranty defenses since products liability is a tort theory. In a
state such as South Carolina where the law of implied warranty
is somewhat uncertain, plaintiffs should consider a products lia-
bility claim.
IV. ALTERNATE THEORIES OF LIABILITY
There are five theories of liability that plaintiffs or cross-
claimants in an asbestos property damage suit may assert when
they are unable to identify the particular manufacturer or sup-
plier of the injury-causing asbestos. These five theories are: (1)
concern of action; (2) alternative liability; (3) market share lia-
bility; (4) enterprise liability; and (5) risk contribution. Of these
five theories, concert of action 09 is the most commonly used.
Typically, concert of action theories have been asserted in dieth-
ylstilbestrol (DES) cases. 110
Under the concert of action theory, a plaintiff must prove
both a parallel course of conduct among defendant manufactur-
ers and an express or tacit agreement not to test adequately or
not to warn of dangers. Proving an agreement between manufac-
turers is a difficult burden for plaintiffs to meet."' Nevertheless,
in In re Related Asbestos Cases"2 the court denied the defend-
ant's motion for summary judgment when the plaintiffs were
found to have met the requirements for a concert of action
108. See 13 Am. JuR. 2D, supra note 88, at §§ 18-17.
109. The concert of action theory has been adopted in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 876 (1965).
110. See, e.g., Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp. 589, 595-96 (D.S.C. 1981); Ryan
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981).
111. See Mizell, 526 F. Supp. 589; Ryan, 514 F. Supp. 1004.
112. 543 F.Supp. 1152, 1159 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
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claim.113
Market share liability was set forth clearly for the first time
in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories"1 4 when the California Su-
preme Court described this theory as an expansion of the alter-
native liability theory established in Summers v. Tice."15 Al-
though the market share theory has been adopted by very few
jurisdictions since Sindell, it has been the topic of much discus-
sion among products liability attorneys." 6 The reason for so
much discussion about both alternate and market share liability
is that if either theory is found to apply, a plaintiff only must
prove that he was exposed to and injured by a product of the
type that each defendant produces, but is not required to prove
which defendant was responsible for the product that caused the
injury.
Under an alternate liability theory, a plaintiff only must
show that he was injured as a proximate result of one of the
defendants' wrongdoing; under market share, all that is needed
to shift the burden of causation to the defendants is an injury by
a product manufactured by the defendants in an identical
method. Courts that have accepted a market share theory have
reasoned that it is an acceptable theory if the plaintiff ulti-
mately would be able to join manufacturers that comprise a sub-
stantial market share of the injury-causing products.117 Addi-
tionally, these courts have stated that it is reasonable to
measure the likelihood that any of the defendants supplied the
offending product"' by the percentage each sold in relation to
the entire production of all manufacturers.
Although it is quite obviously an attractive theory for many
113. The plaintiffs introduced into evidence certain minutes of the Asbestos Textile
Institute, which was active from 1944 until some time after 1975 and whose membership
included Johns-Manville, Raybestos-Manhattan, Amatex, H.K. Porter, Southern Textile,
and Unarco Industries. The court allowed the plaintiffs to introduce this and other evi-
dence of concert of action within the meaning ascribed to that term by the California
Supreme Court. See id. at 1159.
114. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610-13, 607 P.2d 924, 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
115. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948).
116. See Boydstun & Webber, Whatever Happened to "Market Share" Liability?,
FOR THE DEFENSE 14, June 1987; Boydstun & Webber, The Narrow Scope of Market
Share Liability, FOR THE DEFENSE 23, April 1988.
117. See, e.g., Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
118. If the plaintiff can identify several or even one of the manufacturers of the
injury causing asbestos, most courts will reject a market share claim. See Celotex Corp.
v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985).
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plaintiffs, several recent decisions have exposed the apparent
inappropriateness of a market share claim against asbestos man-
ufacturers. First, a plaintiff must be able to present credible evi-
dence that the named defendants represent a "substantial share
of the market." 119 Second, many courts have prohibited use of
the theory on public policy grounds, believing that a policy
favoring recovery by an innocent plaintiff does not justify abro-
gation of the defendants' rights to have a causative link between
their tortuous acts and the plaintiff's injuries. 120 Third, due to
the great variety of manufacturing methods and percentages of
asbestos content and fiber type, the market share requirement of
manufacture by identical process is lacking. 21 Finally, the prior
absence of Johns-Manville, which was probably the largest as-
bestos supplier in the world, from any litigation had been cited
as undercutting the market share requirement of "presence in
the action of a substantial share of the appropriate market.' 1 22
Enterprise liability is a hybrid of the concert of action and
alternative liability theories and has been applied to only three
products: DES, blasting caps, and asbestos. Although enterprise
liability often is confused with market share liability, the enter-
prise theory differs in that each manufacturer may be held liable
for all injuries the product caused by virtue of adherence to an
industry-wide standard of safety.
The enterprise theory first was adopted in the case of Hall
v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.1 23 DuPont was shown to have
adhered to trade standards regarding the manufacture and de-
sign of blasting caps and joint control of risk was shown by in-
dustry-wide agreement and cooperation. The plaintiff proved by
a preponderance of the evidence that one of the manufacturers
had manufactured the injury-causing caps, thus shifting the cau-
sation burden of proof to all the defendants.
The enterprise theory as applied to the asbestos industry
has been rejected in almost every jurisdiction. In several in-
stances, courts have found plaintiffs unable to show adherence
119. Marshall v. Celotex Corp. 651 F. Supp. 389, 393 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
120. See, e.g., Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 743 P.2d 1062 (Okla. 1987).
121. See In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 1982);
Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 33 Ohio St. 3d 40, 50, 514 N.E.2d 691, 700
(1987).
122. Goldman, 33 Ohio St. 3d at 51, 514 N.E.2d at 701.
123. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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to any industry-wide standard, and several others have found
the theory itself repugnant to traditional tort law notions.2 Ad-
ditionally, as with market share, the plaintiff's ability to identify
at least one manufacturer whose product caused the injury
makes the theory inapplicable. 12 5 The only court to adopt the
enterprise theory in an asbestos case did so by mistake, having
actually adopted the market share theory.
1 26
The last theory, risk contribution, first was adopted by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,127 another
DES case. The only other state that has adopted this theory is
California in Gard v. Raymark Industries.28 Under the risk con-
tribution theory, the plaintiff must allege and prove either negli-
gence or strict liability, but may sue just one manufacturer.
Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts
to the defendant to implead other defendants or to prove it did
not manufacture the product that caused the injury.
Obviously, rules governing the above-mentioned theories are
far from being settled and vary greatly from jurisdiction to juris-
diction. While alternative and market share liability theories ap-
pear to have become the most popular among asbestos plain-
tiffs,1 29 courts are reluctant to accept them. Conversely, while
the concert theory generally is accepted by most courts, it has
been applied in only a handful of asbestos cases. 30
The newest and least-tested theory, risk contribution, may
work in favor of many property damage plaintiffs. If a court can
be persuaded to follow the reasoning of the California court in
Gard, plaintiffs may be able to seek punitive damages from de-
fendants even when they were following government or industry
specifications. Moreover, under Gard the fact that a plaintiff
cannot join other potential defendants, because he has settled
with them or because they are bankrupt, does not preclude the
124. See Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1983).
125. See Prelick v. Johns-Manville Corp., 531 F. Supp. 96 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
126. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981),
reversed in part on other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
127. 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984>.
128. 185 Cal. App. 3d 583, 229 Cal. Rptr. 861 (Ct. App. 1986).
129. See Boydstun & Webber, Whatever Happened to "Market Share" Liability?,
FOR THE DEFENSE 14, 14, April 1988.
130. See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
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cause of action against the named defendants. Further, it does
not preclude shifting the burden of proof to the defendants once
the plaintiff proves exposure to the products of one or more of
the defendants. Thus, while risk contribution is a relatively unt-
ested theory, it may provide a viable alternative for plaintiffs
who cannot meet the requirement of the more common theories
or who find themselves in a jurisdiction that has rejected them.
V. CLEANUP AND ABATEMENT
A. Governmental Regulation
The current federal asbestos control statute covers only
schools. 3' When the act was passed, however, some supporters
of the law expressed a desire to extend mandatory asbestos re-
sponse actions to public and commercial buildings. 132 Perhaps
due to the narrow scope of the statute, the EPA has declined to
order a nationwide cleanup program that would include build-
ings other than schools. 3' Congress' interest in possibly ex-
tending the act to public buildings is evidenced by section 213 of
the Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act," which re-
quired the EPA to conduct a study of asbestos-containing mate-
rial in all public buildings.
An EPA survey of ACM, completed in 1986, concluded that
733,000 of the nation's public and commercial buildings con-
tained friable asbestos. 35 Following release of that report, the
EPA stated that it is more important to devote the nation's lim-
ited asbestos-removal resources to the 350,000 contaminated
schools. The emphasis for ACM-contaminated commercial
buildings, the EPA reasoned, should be placed on stopping the
improper removal of asbestos, which could increase the level of
exposure to the occupants.3 6 In 1988 the EPA proposed a three-
131. See ASBESTOS ABATEMENT, supra note 22, at 39.
132. See The Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act, Pub. L. No. 99-519, 100
Stat. 2970 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-2654 (Supp. IV 1986)); see also supra note 29.
133. See EPA rejects national asbestos cleanup, The State (South Carolina), Mar.
1, 1988, at A15, col.1.
134. See The Asbestos Hazard Emergency Response Act, Pub. L. No. 99-519, 100
Stat. 2970 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2641-2654 (Supp. IV 1986)).
135. See id.
136. See id.
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year program for addressing the problem of asbestos in public
and commercial buildings. The EPA recommended, first, that
more money be spent on efforts to train inspectors and cleanup
technicians and, second, that tougher regulations be imposed on
asbestos-removal contractors.'
3 7
The EPA possibly has decided that due to the enormity of
the asbestos-in-buildings problem, a nationwide abatement pro-
gram for all public and commercial buildings would be impossi-
ble to impose. Regulation of the cleanup industry, already gov-
erned for a large part by state law,'38 seems to be the course of
action that the EPA has chosen to endorse. The government ap-
parently believes that increased public awareness and potential
liability will act to motivate building owners to identify and
abate asbestos.
The EPA has taken action under the Clean Air Act that af-
fects both the owners of asbestos-contaminated buildings and
the abatement industry. The EPA lists asbestos as a hazardous
air pollutant under the Clean Air Act.139 Regulations established
under the Clean Air Act govern the removal of asbestos-contain-
ing material from any commercial or industrial structure or
apartments with more than four units. While the requirements
vary depending on the amount of asbestos involved, they apply
to removal in buildings being demolished and buildings in use.
Under the Clean Air Act the EPA can issue notices of violation,
seek injunctions, sue for civil penalties, or bring criminal charges
against violators.
Enforcement of asbestos requirements is delegated to the
states, and approximately forty of these states have approved
state implementation plans, which are currently in place.4 0 Al-
though South Carolina has been one of the most active jurisdic-
tions in the country for asbestos property damage suits, it has
been slow to develop effective asbestos-management legisla-
tion. In June 1986 the South Carolina Department of Health
and Environmental Control (DHEC) promulgated "Standards of
137. See id.
138. See ASBESTOS ABATEMENT, supra note 22.
139. Current Standards under section 112 of the Clear Air Act are found at 40
C.F.R. §§ 61.140..156 (1988).
140. See ASBESTOS ABATEMENT, supra note 22, at 51.
141. By 1987 thirty-two states had adopted some form of legislation regulating as-
bestos abatement. See id.
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Performance for Asbestos Removal Operations.' 1 42 The regula-
tion set standards for asbestos-removal contractors to follow.
Because the standards were only voluntary, however, DHEC
could not enforce them, and soon a wide disparity of compliance
with the regulation developed within the industry.143 Finally, in
December 1987 DHEC's board of directors approved measures
for licensing removal companies, for providing cleanup and dis-
posal standards, and for record-keeping requirements. 144 The
new measures give DHEC more authority because they require
that removal companies and their employees be certified. Firms
that violate these standards may have their licenses revoked or
suspended.
Additional federal and state guidelines and regulations
should be considered by owners of contaminated buildings or
land. Although asbestos is regulated as a "non-hazardous" waste
under subtitle D of the federal Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA), 45 many states have designated ACM waste
as hazardous, and most states place stringent requirements on
its disposal. 46 EPA has set standards for the maximum level of
asbestos concentrations in drinking water. 47 The Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has set both a con-
struction and general industry standard for workplace exposure
to asbestos. 4 s Anyone involved in the abatement, removal, stor-
age or disposal of asbestos products must be vitally aware of his
responsibilities under the various state and federal regulations.
B. Contractor Abatement Problems
1. Costs
Governmental regulations have increased potential liability,
and tenants' and workers' demands have put pressure on build-
142. S.C. CODE REGS., 61-86.1 (Supp. 1988) (effective June 27, 1986).
143. See Asbestos cleanup companies face license standards, The State (South
Carolina), Dec. 18, 1987, at B2, col. 5.
144. See id.
145. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. II 1983).
146. See ASBESTOS ABATEMENT, supra note 22, at 53.
147. Maximum concentrations are set by the EPA under the Safe Drinking Water
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g (1982).
148. For discussion of exposure limits, see ASBESTOS INFORMATION AsS'N, Bull Nos.
86-4422, 86-4423.
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ing owners to abate or remove asbestos. 149 On the other hand,
the high cost of asbestos abatement discourages owners from un-
dertaking cleanup.
Asbestos cleanup is best accomplished through various
methods, depending on the particular circumstances. The fol-
lowing cleanup methods may be required: (1) encapsulation,
whereby ACM is coated with a sealant; (2) enclosure, whereby
airtight walls or ceilings are constructed around asbestos-coated
surfaces; or (3) removal, whereby ACM is removed, packed into
leakproof containers, and shipped to an approved disposal
site.15° Although the initial cost of removal may be higher than
the cost of other control measures, most building owners have
found that removal may cost less in the long term than special
operational practices, periodic reinspection, and repairs associ-
ated with enclosure and encapsulation.' 5' The costs of eventually
removing enclosed or encapsulated materials prior to demolition
also must be considered. 5 2 While removal is the only truly per-
manent solution, its high cost - together with the fact that
many building owners lack the cash reserves or budgetary flexi-
bility to pay for removal work - has proven an insurmountable
obstacle to removal for many owners.
Because public health is at stake, perhaps the government
should intervene by providing some type of financial incentive
for asbestos removal. Tax credits, matching grants, or low-inter-
est loans might be considered. Building owners already have suf-
ficient motivation to remove asbestos; governmental incentives
might provide the financial assistance needed to undertake a se-
rious removal program.
2. Abatement Contractors
The legal risks that face owners also apply to the asbestos-
abatement contractor. The contractor is subject to being sued by
employees, the owners, occupants or subsequent occupants of
149. See G. PETERS & B. PETERS, supra note 59, at 155.
150. See ASBESTOS ABATEMENT, supra note 22, at 45.
151. See EPA, GUIDANCE FOR CONTROLLING FRIABLE ASBESTOS-CONTAINING MATERI-
ALS IN BUILDINGS 3-26 (1983).
152. The cost per square foot for asbestos removal by qualified contractors may cost
anywhere from $2.50 to $100.00 per square foot depending on where and in what form
the asbestos is contained. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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the building, and even the passersby. Because of the legal expo-
sure, abatement contractors must operate a single-purpose busi-
ness. Large contracting companies generally will not risk assets
from their other operations. For this reason, most abatement
contractors are small and relatively new. The size, age, and inex-
perience of many of these companies make obtaining insurance
or bonding difficult. Experience is hard to gain since few cus-
tomers are willing to hire an uninsured contractor. 1 3
Despite governmental regulations and the best intentions of
most experienced abatement contractors, a high proportion of all
asbestos-removal jobs are still performed improperly. A sloppy
job can severely contaminate the building and surrounding ar-
eas.'" Some building owners, including government agencies,
have hired contractors to perform quick "dirty" removals. Such
"dirty" contractors offer no personal protection to employees
who rip out asbestos, which is disposed as regular trash. 55 The
asbestos covered "snowmen" and the "midnight cowboy" con-
tractors have not disappeared. 5 6
While the probability of a dirty job still exists, building
owners can reduce the risk of such a job by selecting a zealously
scientific and highly responsible contractor. Prequalification
questionnaires should be used prior to selecting an abatement
contractor to determine the contractor's history of EPA cita-
tions, worker training, proposed disposal subcontractor, types of
equipment, financial status, insurance coverage, and bonding
limits. Recommendations and references also should be used
prior to selecting an abatement contractor.157
Insurance and bonding of abatement contractors should be
considered but may be of little value due to the time delay of
asbestos disease. Injury likely would not occur until years after
both the exposure and the term of the insurance policies. Insur-
153. See G. PETRs & B. PmrERs, SOURCE BOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL,
LEGAL, AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS (Supp. 1987).
154. See G. PETERS & B. PETERS, supra note 59, at 158.
155. See G. P=rsRs & B. PETERs, supra note 153, at 3-4.
156. See id. The term "snowman" has been used to describe the appearance of as-
bestos-removal workers who had that appearance due to their being covered head to toe
with asbestos dust when improper removal techniques were used. "Midnight cowboy"
refers to a contractor who would perform removals and dumpings at night to circumvent
the legal requirements for these activities.
157. See Fried, supra note 27, at 125-27.
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ance companies might hesitate to issue a policy at all. Thus, the
individuals responsible for the asbestos abatement, or its delay,
may find themselves individually liable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Most Americans have been exposed to asbestos in a variety
of forms. Many researchers still conclude that "asbestos in
building air will almost never" pose a health hazard to building
occupants." 158 The law, however, disagrees with this opinion and
requires that owners make some very hard decisions.
Great personal risk exists for those who are responsible for
asbestos-contaminated commercial and public buildings, as well
as to the entities that own them. Many owners can ill afford
their portion of the estimated thirty-billion-dollar cleanup
bill,6"" but the cost, nevertheless, must be incurred. Owners must
adhere to a legally defined, precise sense of responsibility in
bearing the cost of proper abatement. Using forethought and a
rigorous, detailed program of cleanup, an owner can avoid any
significant risk of civil or criminal liability, while retaining sev-
eral options for seeking restitution from those who created the
hazard.
Jeffrey M. Nelson
158. Cross, Asbestos in Schools: A Remonstrance Against Panic, 11 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 87 (1986).
159. See ASBESTOS ABATEMENT, supra note 22.
1070 [Vol. 40
28
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 11
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss4/11
